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Media reform since 1987
Taiwan’s media are still at an early stage of democratisation but it
cannot be denied that progress has been made
Gary D. Rawnsley and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley
1 In his inauguration speech of May 20th 2004, President Chen Shui-bian discussed his
vision  for  his  second  administration,  and  commentators  on  Taiwan  politics  have
dissected and analysed the meaning and implications of his plans. One sentence, buried
within a paragraph on reform, has largely gone unnoticed: “Persist with reform – We
shall forge ahead in response to the people’s demand for reform in our political and
judicial  system,  in  the  educational  system,  and  in  our  financial  and  fiscal
infrastructures;  for  improvement  in  the  quality  of  our  media1;  and,  for  comprehensive
social reform”. 
2 It  is  only  too  easy  to  miss  this  reference to  the  media  as  Chen’s  discussion of  the
constitutional “re-engineering project” dominated his inaugural address. The glass is
either half empty or half full: critics may claim that Chen glossed over media reform
because  his administration believe  it  is  a  non-issue;  the  more  optimistic  among us
might take heart from the fact that media reform was mentioned at all, and the brief
reference to it is an indication that much has already been achieved. 
3 Both  sides  of  this  debate  agree  that  media  reform  is  a  valuable  indicator  of
democratisation. It provides a benchmark that reveals an abundance of information
about the levels of freedom, tolerance, social justice and pluralism within a political
system2.  We  now  accept  that  the  media  were  central  to  the  development  of  both
democratic  culture  and  procedures  in  Taiwan3.  The  media  landscape  has  extended
beyond any previously imagined horizon, and audiences can choose from a plethora of
outlets—print,  broadcast  and  internet—demonstrating  that  Taiwan  has  created  a
genuinely pluralistic media environment.
4 This article reviews the changes that have taken place since the lifting of martial law
(jieyanfa) in 1987 and gives a perspective of how the media are faring at the beginning
of  Chen  Shui-bian’s  second  term.  His  administration  is  routinely  criticised  for  not
having  paid  sufficient  attention  to  irregularities  that  continue  to  impede  the
development of a free and democratic media. Detractors were particularly vocal during
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and after the controversial 2004 presidential election when the predominantly “blue”4
media were able to present a decidedly prejudiced picture of the campaign, raising
again the problem of biased coverage of politics5. 
5 However, while the record reveals that Taiwan’s media are still  at an early stage of
democratisation we cannot  deny the  progress  made,  and that  Taiwan’s  media  look
increasingly similar to those operating in systems at comparatively similar stages of
democratic consolidation6. 
Under the KMT
6 When  the  Kuomintang  (Nationalist  Party)  began  the  dual  processes  of  social
liberalisation and political democratisation in 1987, the state system had already been
exercising  tight  control  over  print  and  broadcast  media  for  thirty  years.  The
government  had  enacted  a  series  of  laws—some  vague,  some  more  explicit—that
detailed the responsibilities of the media and the sanctions they faced if the laws were
violated.  Directive  No.  3148,  issued  in  June  1951,  was  the  most  interesting  as  it
suggested the more insidious methods that the government would continue to use to
control the media. (The Directive used the need for paper rationing to justify why the
press were subject to politically managed restraint7). Many such laws were as vague and
arbitrary  as  possible,  thus  allowing  the  state  to  exercise  expediency  in  their
interpretation and application. In contrast, the government felt no need to hide behind
paper rationing in the martial law, Article 11 of which defended limits to press freedom
on grounds of national security, while the Law on Publications (chubanfa)8 described
how the government could close a daily newspaper without recourse to judicial process
or authority9.  Moreover,  while government censors did not inspect newspaper copy
before  publication,  the  legal  machinery  did  allow  the  government  to  recall  and
confiscate newspapers after publication if they had printed anything that conflicted
with political or military interests. 
7 However, the most direct method of influence was also the most simple: ownership of
media enterprises. In addition to claiming legal authority, in the early 1980s the KMT
owned four national daily newspapers, the government owned two, and the military
five, but the implied separation was deceptive because of the overlapping character of
party/state/military political authority. A similar structure managed the three oldest
national  television  stations,  Taiwan  Television  Company  (TTV),  China  Television
Company (CTV) and Chinese Television System (CTS). Again, these were owned by the
government, the party and the military (See Table 1). 
8 In addition, the KMT government successfully managed the media through the creation
of a complex patron-client network that allowed agencies representing the KMT, the
provincial government and the state to manage media appointments. This meant that
newspaper editors either were members of the KMT or were supportive of the KMT’s
political  agenda, thus sympathetic journalists,  owners and political  appointees were
located  in  prominent  and  powerful  “gate-keeping”  positions  within  the  media.  For
example,  the  proprietors  of  the  two  privately  owned  newspapers  with  the  highest
circulation,  Zhongguo  shibao  (China  Times)  and  Lianhe  bao  (United  Daily  News)  were
members of the KMT Central Standing Committee. These private newspapers may have
challenged the government press for readership, but their owners guaranteed that they
would be  supportive  of  the  government.  “To a  certain  extent,  the  obligation to  be
profitable,  the need to  sell,  incited the private  papers  to  distance themselves  from
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propaganda, while remaining within limits acceptable to the regime, in order not to
end up being closed down”10.
9 Exceptions to this pattern of ownership were rare, but did offer some hope that the
voice of the Taiwanese would find a channel of expression in mainstream publications.
Zili wanbao (Independent Evening News) and Minzhong ribao (People’s Daily) were owned and
controlled by Taiwanese. Taiwan shibao (Taiwan Times), located in Kaohsiung, was also
privately  owned  and  independent,  publishing  what  Bruce  Jacobs  called  “strongly
worded editorials and comments”11.  Even in a media environment subject to myriad
political  and  legal  restrictions,  the  KMT  was  prepared  to  accept  a  level  of  press
independence. 
10 Such  limited  exceptions  notwithstanding,  the  restricted  political  environment  of
Taiwan under martial law constrained the media from doing little other than comply
with a government demand that they act as agencies of transmission for the official
ideology.  Attempts to  evade the law were met with severe punishment:  during the
“White Terror” (baise kongbu) between 1950 and 1987, hundreds of reporters, writers
and editors were purportedly harassed, interrogated and often jailed12. 
After martial law
11 The  lifting  of  martial  law  in  1987,  and  the  social  liberalisation  and  political
democratisation that followed,  allowed for the dramatic transformation of  Taiwan’s
media environment. The most noticeable change was the rapid proliferation of legal
media. The figures are instructive. By mid-2003, there were:
• 602 newspapers (31 between 1951 and 1987; 393 in August 1999)
• 174 radio stations (prior to 1993, there were only 33; call-in radio stations were legalised in
1994)
• Four national television stations (compared to three when liberalisation began in 1987) 
• Access to hundreds of cable channels broadcasting local and international programmes (the
transmission and reception of cable television broadcasts remained illegal until 1993)13.
These channels include a national public television system. 
12 The KMT’s role in this process should be acknowledged, and Taiwan passed a milestone
in September 1989 when the then Director of the Government Information Office (GIO,
xinwenju)14, Shaw Yu-ming, observed that self-regulation by the media was preferable to
state supervision. He also recognised that, in a democratic political system, the media
have a responsibility to scrutinise the decisions and behaviour of the government and
hold  it  accountable  for  its  actions:  “The  government,”  he  said,  “is  …  under  the
surveillance  of  the  media,  and  it  is  not  suitable  for  the  government  to  use
administrative means or the law to punish them. That would raise criticisms about
freedom  of  the  press  being  hampered”15.  Chu  Jiying,  Director  of  the  KMT  Cultural
Affairs Department echoed these sentiments. In a democracy, he said: “the press is the
spokesman of the public’s interests. I believe that the role of the party’s spokesman is
to provide information,  not to control  the news.  He must manage information,  not
control it. He must explain the party’s policy to the media and relay public opinion to
his superiors. The rigid, domineering political style is out of date”16. 
13 From exercising political, economic and legal restraint on the media so that they might
serve a distinct ideological and developmental agenda, the KMT had moved to a
position where the party recognised that its  ambition for a democratic  society was
impossible without a free and independent media. This was the first tentative step in
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the separation of the media and politics in Taiwan, an aspiration for which President
Chen Shui-bian assumed full responsibility after his inauguration in 2000. 
Under Chen Shui-bian
14 Chen’s  election  campaign  identified  political  influence  in  the  media  as  an  urgent
problem that  required resolution.  Given that  his  party,  the  Democratic  Progressive
Party (DPP) had suffered from the KMT’s monopoly on information and media17. Chen’s
interest in this matter was not surprising. To realise his ambition of separating the
media and politics (processes and institutions), Chen understood that he would first
have to deal with the issue of media ownership. 
15  The  outlook  was  promising.  First,  Chen’s  administration  announced  that  it  would
relinquish its shares in the media. Then, the government could make a start in limiting
partisan  and  state  influence  in  the  media.  While  the  former  objective  was  easy  to
achieve, the latter aim was less successful for three reasons: first, while noble in vision,
it was difficult to accomplish, and the government has never formulated a coherent
plan  to  suggest  a  solution.  Second,  the  political  environment  is  not  particularly
conducive  to  such  reforms.  Although  Chen  won  the  presidency  in  2000,  a  “blue”
majority  in  the  Legislative  Yuan  has  routinely  hampered  the  administration’s
reforming efforts of a number of serious issues.  Third, the political  interests in the
media  were  so  powerful  and so  embedded that  it  would  be  tricky  to  untangle  the
complex corporate patron-client network that structured the media industry. 
16 In fact, members of the DPP enjoyed privileged positions within the media industries
during  the  process  of  liberalisation  and  were  themselves  reluctant  to  concede  to
change.  The  most  prominent  case  was  that  of  Cai  Tong-rong  (Trong  Chai),  a  DPP
legislator and member of the party’s Central Standing Committee. While serving as an
elected representative, he also worked as chair of Formosa Television (FTV), a DPP-
supporting national television station that he helped to establish in 1997 to break the
KMT’s broadcasting monopoly18. This was a significant test case; if the DPP was seen to
be so serious in separating media from politics that it was prepared to lose such high-
level  control  of  the  only  television  station  that  openly  supported  the  party,  the
sincerity  of  the  administration  could  not  be  questioned.  Under  pressure  from  the
government and the media, Cai announced his resignation in September 2003. 
17 The then Director-General of the GIO, Chung Chin, was tasked with finding a solution.
“Our basic aim, she told the Education and Culture Committee of the Legislative Yuan,
is to filter out improper influences, both political and commercial, that may stand in
the way of the neutrality of news gathering and presenting”19. The proposed means of
accomplishing  this  aim  were  unimaginative  and  had  little  effect.  The  committee
discussed,  and  then  shelved  its  proposal  to  prevent  government,  state  or  political
parties from owning majority shares in media enterprises. The suggested reason for the
setback was the members’ reluctance to take potentially controversial steps that might
undermine the freedom of speech Taiwan had only just acquired. 
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1. Ownership of TTV, CTV, CTS and FTV
Sources: Wang Zhen-huan, “Guangbo dianshi meiti de kongzhi quan” (Control of the Broadcasting and
TV Media), in Zheng Rui-cheng et al. (eds.), Jiegou guangdian meiti: jianli guangdian xin zhixu
(Deconstructing the Broadcasting Media: Establishing a New Order for the Broadcasting Media),
Taipei, Cheng Society, 1993, pp. 77-128; Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley, Public Service Television in Taiwan,
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 1998; Chen Bing-hong, Jiegou meiti (Deconstructing the
Media), Taipei, Yeh-yeh Book Gallery, 2003, 
pp. 289-290
18 However, the Legislative Yuan did finally succumb to executive pressure and passed the
reforms. In February 2003, the KMT announced that it would comply with the new law
and sell  its stockholdings20.  Such remedies to a seemingly intractable problem were
only possible with the political will of all political parties, and especially the opposition
KMT that had most to lose from these reforms. For their part, TTV and CTS face two
options  for  future  reform.  Either  they  can  become part  of  a  new public  television
group, or they can follow CTV’s example and become fully privatised organisations. At
the time of writing (July 2004) 25% of Taiwan Television Company belongs to banks
owned by the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministries of Defence and Education still
control  the  Chinese  Television System (see  Table  1).  The difficulties  in  overcoming
traditional ownership patterns are most telling, and it is unfortunate that partisan and
government influence is still pervasive.
19 In the same way that ownership of television stations lends credibility to accusations of
political bias, so the press are routinely criticised for being partial to one particular
party. The United Daily News and the China Times, the two broadsheets with the highest
circulation in  Taiwan, have been rounded on as  a  mouthpiece of  the blue alliance,
especially during the 2004 presidential election. Critics have discovered an apparent
absence  of  professionalism  among  journalists  and  editors  working  for  these
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newspapers, suggesting that they do not follow the news agenda, but choose instead
what to cover and how from a blue political perspective21.
20 This  is  a  serious,  but  unfair  accusation,  as  newspapers  throughout  the  democratic
world tend towards bias in favour of one political party or platform. In a commentary
in the English language Taipei  Times,  Lee Ming-tsung alluded to the “emotional and
slightly emotional language” that the China Times and United Daily News used to describe
protestors  following  the  2004  presidential  election,  concluding  that  “it  is  probably
better to call that material ‘propaganda’ rather than ‘reports’ or ‘commentaries’”22. Yet,
no  one  familiar  with  the  tabloid  press  in  Britain―especially  those  that  position
themselves  on  the  right  wing  of  the  political  spectrum―will  be  surprised  that
newspapers in democratic societies can act in this way. In fact, Taipei Times is a sister
newspaper of Taiwan’s Chinese-language broadsheet with the third highest circulation,
Ziyou shibao (Liberty Times). Both the Liberty Times and the Taipei Times follow their own
political agendas in favour of the “green” (i.e. pro-DPP) alliance. In other words, KMT-
oriented newspapers may dominate the market, but alternative newspapers promoting
alternative political platforms are available. Again, this is not unusual; in Britain, the
newspaper market is dominated by titles that are supportive of the political right. Yet,
the  left-leaning  Guardian newspaper  is  sold  alongside  the  more  Conservative  Daily
Telegraph.  The  bias  is  overt,  and  the  choice  of  opinion  available  to  the  average
newspaper reader is considered a blessing23.
21 Neither should we overlook the influence of cable television in Taiwan. In addition to
the  four  major  national  television  stations,  there  are  hundreds  of  cable  channels
competing  for  audience  attention.  Since  legalisation  in  1993,  cable  television  has
become an increasingly powerful  source of  information,  especially during elections.
According to the Advertising Yearbook of Taiwan, for the elections of the Legislative Yuan
in 2001, the political parties spent about NT$2 billion in advertisement on non-cable
television and NT$5.5 billion in cable television24. An advertisement of just ten seconds
on  TTV,  CTV  and  CTS  would  cost  NT$33,000  and  on  TVBS  NT$30,00025.  There  are
currently six major cable system operators (see Table 2), and while some are inclined
towards the blue camp, most are far more concerned with making profits and therefore
do not operate according to any specific political agenda,. 
22 Another  method that  Taiwan’s  government  has  tried to  facilitate  the separation of
politics  and  media  is  to  regulate  the  tendency  for  politicians  to  control  their  own
television  or  radio  stations,  or  become  media  celebrities  by  hosting  their  own
programmes. As of March 2003, 15 elected politicians hosted or produced television or
radio talk shows. The most prolific was the independent legislator, Chen Wen-chien
(Sisy Chen). Until April 2003, Chen hosted Sisy’s News on Star TV, in addition to a daily
radio talk show, UFO Dinner, on UFO Radio. In March 2003, her contract with Star TV
was not renewed because, she believes, the station was pressured to drop her by the
ruling DPP. Star Group Taiwan Ltd. denied political pressure, claiming that there are
already too many political talk shows on air. Star TV also broadcasts former politician
Jaw Shaw-kong’s News Hijacker, while legislator May Chin hosts Lighting the Lamp on CTS
and Shen Chih-hwei (a legislator with the PFP) is responsible for a daily talk show on
Taichung radio.  Many  politicians  have  profited—politically  and  commercially—from
the proliferation of cable television and radio channels that are relatively simple to
launch  and  have  small  set-up  costs.  These  shows  are  important  as  they  give  the
politicians a medium through which they can address their own local constituencies
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free from mediation by journalists. Most importantly, however, is that the celebrity
politicians listed here are from the blue alliance, adding to the suspicion of widespread
media  bias.  Some may suggest  that  the  DPP has  a  right  to  be  concerned that  it  is
playing on an uneven field; others would say that the DPP is merely trying to mute
those voices that stand in opposition to their own, and thus restrict Taiwan’s much
cherished freedom of speech. 
23 To circumvent some of the problems associated with this tendency, President Chen
issued an ultimatum to Taiwan’s politicians towards the end of his first term in office:
all  elected  politicians  and  officials  should  relinquish  their  media  interests  by
September  5th  2003.  This  affected  58  persons  who  were  now  required  to  choose
between their dual roles in politics and the media. The law does not affect the politician
television and radio hosts who do not have commercial interests in particular media
enterprises, since its intention is to prohibit civil servants and political party members
from  owning,  funding  or  acting  as  founder,  director or  manager  of  stations  and
newspapers. However, this caveat did not satisfy everybody. Some legislators argued
that  the  government  should  prevent  elected  politicians  from producing  or  hosting
political  and/or  news  programmes  on  television  and  radio.  For  example,  the  DPP
legislator, Julian Kuo, remarked, “Politicians hosting or producing broadcast shows is
just like athletes serving as referees in a single game”26.
24 However,  critics  have  accused  the  DPP  of  hypocrisy  in  its  ambition  to  separate
completely  the  media  and  politics,  and  have  indicted  the  administration  for  using
government  communication  resources  for  its  own  partisan  purposes.  When  in
opposition, the DPP regularly censured the KMT’s media monopoly because it allowed
the government to use public channels of communication for party propaganda. This
suspicion resurfaced in March 2003, when the GIO announced it planned to integrate
various government agencies’ resources to buy airtime and advertisement space in the
media to promote government policies. The funding would provide the resources for a
NT$200 million promotion between April 1st and June 1st 2003, and NT$900 million
more from July 2003 to March 2004. This means that instead of entitling all government
departments to purchase airtime and advertising space to promote their  individual
policies, the GIO combines all departmental promotional budgets to facilitate a single
annual bulk purchase of media space. In March 2003, the GIO revealed that it has spent
more than NT$30 million in 2002 to buy television airtime to promote government
policies.
25 The opposition viewed such initiatives as a way to kick-start Chen Shui-bian’s election
campaign at the taxpayer’s expense, despite the GIO being the government (and not the
DPP) Information Office. The opposition claimed that such moves are a clear danger to
press  freedom  and  contradict  the  DPP’s  apparent  determination  to  end  political
involvement in the media. However, by merely criticising the plans the blue alliance
failed to see the wider picture. The problem is not one of allowing the government to
use the GIO in this way (after all, it is the responsibility of the government to publicise
policies  and  thus  be  accountable  to  public  opinion),  but  one  of  ensuring  that  all
political parties compete with each other on a level playing field. The key question is
how the political  system can ensure that  the GIO remains  the spokesperson of  the
government and not whichever party happens to be in power. The blue opposition has
clearly failed to differentiate between party and government propaganda, which is not
surprising since the distinction was non-existent before 1987. 
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26 But ownership patterns and political influence are not the only problems that Taiwan’s
media  face.  As  the  president  suggested  in  his  2004  inauguration  speech,  quality  of
output is also a major concern that requires urgent attention. 
Issues of quality and competition
27 The Taiwanese government is walking the same tightrope as other democracies: how
much media regulation is required in a liberal-democratic free market system? This is
becoming  an  urgent  matter  given  the  rapid  and  disturbing  development  of  more
inquisitive  media  that  are  quite  prepared  to  engage  in  less  reputable  and  more
sensationalist styles of reporting. So-called “yellow” or tabloid journalism thrives in
Taiwan  on  a  scale  never  before  imagined.  The  most  recent  entrant  to  Taiwan’s
newspaper market is Pingguo ribao (Apple Daily), run by Hong Kong entrepreneur Jimmy
Lai. Apple Daily, a tabloid newspaper with a reputation for celebrity gossip, scandal, and
crime scene photographs, was first established in Hong Kong and hit Taiwan’s news-
stands on May 2nd 2003 with a claimed circulation of 750,00027. It follows the success of
Jimmy Lai’s first Taiwan venture, Yizhoukan (Next Magazine), which is now the island’s
biggest selling weekly. For the Taiwanese, free speech is synonymous with democracy,
and here we identify a fundamental problem that is a serious barrier to further reforms
designed to encourage quality.  The president of one prominent NGO, Taiwan Media
Watch,  outlined  the  dilemma:  When  does  freedom  of  speech  end  and  moral
responsibility begin?28 The apparent lack of media sensitivity in reporting disasters,
crime and personal tragedies suggests that they are incapable of exercising the kind of
professional  self-discipline  and  self-regulation  called  for.  “Any  government
intervention in the operations of the media is unacceptable because freedom of the
press is  pivotal in a civilised society.  But as the tendency towards indecency looms
large in our local TV programming, to expect self-discipline on the part of the media is
a difficult option. So the only feasible solution is to allow the public to use its voice to
tell the media what they consider to be quality TV programmes”29. 
28 Under  Chen  Shui-bian,  the  GIO  has  discussed  ways  of  monitoring  media  output  to
combat the growth in tabloid-style journalism, but has also tried to design a regulatory
framework that would allow journalists to carry out their work free from the fear of
government interference and retribution. Again, however, progress has been slow. In
June 2002,  the GIO reviewed a draft  Mass Communications Law designed to “better
regulate Taiwan’s media” 30.  The mooted Law would “ban invasions of privacy by the
media and prevent the media from violating an individual’s ‘autonomy’. It would also
more clearly delineate the ratings system for media content and upgrade the level of
media regulations from that of executive orders to full legal standing”. In other words,
the system that the GIO designed actually reinforces control over the media, rather than
protecting the media from government interference.  Huang Hui-chen,  the Director-
General of the GIO after 2003, conceding “Taiwan’s freedom of speech is among one of
the most liberal in the world” [sic], did warn that “such freedom should not be abused.
The media’s responsibility should be to imbue audiences with positive social values …
The GIO has been aggressively imposing fines and rating television programmes, and
we take our responsibilities very seriously”31. 
29 One of the most controversial decisions taken by the GIO was its award of NT$950,000
to the Foundation for the Prevention of Public Damage by the Media to fund the regular
evaluation of the six mainstream Chinese-language newspapers. This would measure
“justice, objectivity, appropriateness and accuracy”, with the results released to the
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public every two months. Critics of this proposal not only question the methodology—
how can one measure justice and appropriateness?—but also deem the exercise a step
backwards that will only damage press freedom. The proposals extend to the broadcast
media  and  the  signs  are  not  particularly  encouraging:  “Concerned  that  locally
produced TV programmes are becoming increasingly sensationalistic or inaccurate, the
Radio and Television Affairs Department of the GIO has decided to begin monitoring
and evaluating local programmes. (…) Because many TV shows have damaged some
people’s  privacy  and  the  sensationalism  of  some  programmes  has  made  audiences
uncomfortable, we have decided to take action and manage TV shows”, said Hong Chong-
jan, the new director of the department32. Such management undermines Chen Shui-
bian’s commitment that “the government would not suppress the freedom of the press
or people’s freedom of speech under the pretext of national security considerations”,
and he urged the media to develop processes of self-regulation. 
30 The government has continued to accrue powers in order to provide the conditions for
“quality”. In October 2003, the preparatory office of the new National Communications
Commission (NCC, guojia chuanbo weiyuanhui)  opened. This independent organisation
responsible to the Executive Yuan, will oversee and regulate the telecommunications,
media  and information technology  sectors.  Its  creation reflects  the  convergence  of
information technology.  Thus mobile telephones,  the internet and cable technology
have  blurred  the  differentiation  between  broadcasting  and  communication.  More
ominously,  the  NCC  is  responsible  for  censoring  online  data,  television  and  radio
programmes  and  other  information  broadcast  through  channels  of  mass
communications. The members of the commission are political appointees, chosen by
the premier for five-year terms, and would replace the GIO.
31 Are  these  examples  of  Taiwan  taking  one-step  forwards,  two  steps  back?  Can  the
government really imbue quality within the media and inspire journalists to higher
standards of professionalism by legislating for it? The government does have to create
the framework for satisfactory self-regulation that will  set  acceptable standards for
quality (for example conceding more powers to media-interested activists and groups
within civil  society) rather than trying to interfere directly with the producers and
their products. 
32 One  of  the  most  urgent  challenges  that Taiwan’s  media  face  in  a  democratic
environment  is  the  absence  of  specific  laws  that  define  and  regulate  classified
information. The existing arbitrary definition of what is and is not allowed continues to
confer upon the government and the GIO almost the same leverage over the media as
its KMT predecessors. For example, Article 21 of the Broadcasting and Television Law
forbids television programmes from spreading rumours or presenting material in a way
that would disrupt law and order, but fails to provide any specific details or speculate
on circumstances  when the  government  might  invoke this  law.  It  is  worrying that
neither the media nor the government are clear where the boundaries are,  what is
permissible,  and  who  is  responsible  if  things  go  wrong.  The  Chen  Shui-bian
administration  has  so  far  failed  to  demarcate  these  boundaries,  which  means  that
journalists  are  still  vulnerable  to  abuse  and  intimidation.  They  are  often  under
surveillance, their offices may be searched, and sometimes their telephones (and those
of family and friends) are bugged. 
33 For  example,  in  October  2000  members  of  the  Taipei  District  Prosecutor’s  Office
searched the offices and homes of journalists working for the Zhongshi wanbao (China
Media reform since 1987
China Perspectives, 56 | november - december 2004
9
Times  Express).  They  were  searching  for  information  about  corruption  within  the
National Security Bureau that officials had leaked to the media. Journalists complained
that  they,  and  their  friends  and  families,  were  under  close  surveillance,  and  their
telephone  conversations  monitored.  The  prosecutors  justified  their  action  with
reference  to  “national  security”.  They  claimed  the  leaked  information  could have
included “highly sensitive state secrets” that threatened the lives of bureau members. 
34 More often, however, the intimidation is non-political and originates with the criminal
underworld.  Official  prosecutors  have  searched  the  offices  of  Jimmy  Lai’s  Taiwan
enterprise,  Next Magazine,  and  hired  thugs  have  vandalised  them  following  the
magazine’s  exposure  of  criminal  activity.  One  of  the  more  subtle,  but  increasingly
popular,  forms  of  intimidation  is  the  threat  of  libel  suits.  In  fact,  Antonio  Chiang,
briefly the publisher of the Taiwan ribao (Taiwan Daily) in 1996, once said that his main
job was “to go to court”, especially when his newspaper was sued six times in a three
month  period.  In  other  words,  libel  laws  remain  a  serious  risk  to  Taiwan’s  media
freedom, but they are necessary given the growth of sensational reporting that violates
the privacy of people in the public eye. Again, progress rests on finding a balance, and
ensuring  that  the  libel  laws  are  so  tight  that  both  sides—media  and  public—know
precisely what laws are being broken,  the punishments they can expect,  and when
recourse to the courts is acceptable.
35 Liberal commentators have identified as the solution to problems within the media,
especially  ownership  patterns  and  obvious  bias,  market  mechanisms  that  concede
greater power to the consumer. Reviewing the government’s plans to reform the media
by imposing new regulations, one anonymous member of President Chen’s Cabinet said,
“The  less  government  interference,  the  better.  If  the  public  dislikes  a  certain  TV
channel  or  radio  station  which  they  think  is  manipulated  by  a  certain  party  or
individual  they detest,  they simply refuse  to  watch it  or  listen to  it.  It’s  that  darn
simple.” The short life of the Shoudu zaobao (Capital Morning Post), established in May
1989  and  financed  by  a  prominent  DPP  politician,  Kang  Ning-hsiang,  clearly
demonstrates the power of market forces. The newspaper closed down in August 1990
not because it voiced unpalatable or unpopular political opinions, but because it could
not capture an adequate share of the market. In 2000, the GIO informed the Taiwan
xinwen  bao  (Taiwan  Daily  News),  a  newspaper  owned  by  the  Taiwan  Provincial
Government and based in Kaohsiung, that it might have to close down if it did not make
a  profit.  To  turn  its  fortune  around,  the  publication  had  to  downsize  into  a  local
newspaper and make two hundred of its staff redundant. Even state-controlled media
are not immune to the hidden hand of the market33.
36 However, the market does not guarantee quality. As competition intensifies, the media
are less willing to invest in innovative programming and instead battle to capture the
same middle-ground audiences with the same formats. This is particularly serious in
television, where the national stations now compete with the cable channels that are
gaining popularity34.
37 Moreover, the idea that competition provides opportunities for consumer-power is a
little  disingenuous.  While  the  government  has  made  important  strides  in  ending
political  influence  in  the  media,  close  examination  of  the  cable  television  industry
reveals a concentration of power in the hands of a few very powerful consortiums. The
Cable Television Law, passed by the Legislative Yuan in 1993, stipulated that to prevent
the creation of a monopoly, two or more operators should serve each geographic area
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of  Taiwan.  However,  fierce  competition  ensued,  whereby  cable  operators  blocked
channels belonging to their competitors regardless of their popularity with audiences.
In  the  meantime,  it  is  not  unusual  for  bigger  operators  to  squeeze  their  smaller
competitors out of the market. In contrast to the aims of the Cable Television Law, each
area is dominated by one cable operator, with two or more able to exist in only a few
areas (Table 2). 
 
2. An overview of the cable market to December 2002
Source: Chen Bing-hong, Jiegou meiti, op. cit., pp. 291-292.=
NB : * This ﬁgure is based on the calculation that 5.55 million households island-wide subscribed to
cable television.
** Some of the operators use different company names to apply for licences. Therefore, it appears
that there are two or more competitors. However, in reality, they belong to the same consortium.
38 Since winning control of the presidency in 2000, Chen Shui-bian’s administration has
proposed numerous technical amendments to the Cable Television Law to reduce the
possibility of broadcasting monopolies by powerful consortiums. However, the impact
has been minimal for the same reasons that reform has been difficult in other areas of
the media, namely a blue-dominated Legislative Yuan battling with a DPP executive,
and the political and commercial interests of legislators in blocking reform. 
39 Taiwan’s  media  have  experienced  a  dramatic  and  rapid  transformation  since  1987.
From having politically defined responsibilities that were designed to further the KMT
government’s  agenda,  the  media  are  now  in  a  stronger  position  than  ever  to
interrogate the decisions, actions and behaviour of politicians. The transparency and
accountability  that  are  characteristic  of  Taiwan’s  media  today  are  important
benchmarks of the level of democracy there. While we must acknowledge the role of
the KMT in building the foundations for these circumstances, we must nevertheless
recognise the progress under the Chen Shui-bian administration. Problems persist: the
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issue of ownership has yet to be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction, while political bias
within  the  predominantly  blue  media  continues  to  be  particularly  worrisome,
especially  during  elections.  Moreover,  the  quality  of  output,  and  particularly  the
quality  of  journalism,  is  cause  for  concern.  A  noticeable  decline  in  deference  to
authority,  prompted  by  the  gaining  of  freedom  of  speech,  media  pluralism  and
competition, and the rising power of market over state forces, have encouraged the
government to think about the problems posed by a completely free and independent
media in a liberal-democratic society. Moreover, what is the relationship between the
legal  process  and  the  media?  Here,  Taiwan  faces  a  dilemma:  can  the  government
legislate for quality, and thus risk being criticised for impeding the freedoms the media
fought long and hard to attain? Or can it depend on the power of market competition
and the consumer—his right to choose not to buy a particular newspaper or turn the
television over to a different channel—to regulate the media? 
40 The SARS epidemic of 2003 was a particularly testing time for Taiwan’s news media,
and the debate over where to draw the line between the public’s right to know and
journalistic  sensationalism  continued  long  after  the  World  Health  Organisation
removed Taiwan from its list of SARS-affected areas. One poll discovered that 65% of
1,093  respondents  thought  SARS-related  news  reports  were  “overly  sensational.
Another 30% described them as unnecessarily and intolerably repetitive. It seems that
accurate information was difficult to come by, and that the competitive 24 hours news
environment made speed of reporting more important35. Industry insiders claim that
practices associated with professional journalism, such as double-checking the facts
and the reliability of sources, were sacrificed. All media are now desperately trying to
learn  from  their  experience  of  the  SARS  crisis.  However, such  problems  are  not
culturally  specific;  British  and  American  media  faced  similar  criticisms  of  their
coverage of the 2003 war against Iraq. Few reporters on the front line have military
expertise, while the British government and the BBC are embroiled in a volatile dispute
about the reliability of sources. Perhaps Taiwan’s experience during the SARS outbreak
demonstrates  that,  after  all,  its  media  are  simply  responding  to  the  challenges  of
democratic society. It is a steep learning curve for all concerned. 
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ABSTRACTS
Media reform is a valuable indicator of democratisation. It provides an abundance of information
about the levels of freedom, tolerance, social justice and pluralism within a political system. This
article reviews the changes in the Taiwanese media that have occurred since the lifting of martial
law in 1987 and considers how the media are faring at the beginning of Chen Shui-bian’s second
term. Taiwan’s media are still at an early stage of democratisation but it cannot be denied that
progress has been made and that Taiwan’s media are looking increasingly like those operating in
systems at comparatively similar stages of democratic consolidation. 
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